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FINDING FACTS BUT MISSING THE LAW: THE GOLDSTONE REPORT, 
GAZA AND LAWFARE 
Laurie R. Blank* 
Civilian deaths in Gaza often produce immediate conclusions of 
Israeli war crimes and other violations of international law. We now see 
similar statements in the aftermath of U.S. or allied attacks resulting in civi-
lian deaths in Afghanistan.  The increasing use of law as a tool of war—a 
practice termed ―lawfare‖—offers a likely and potentially disturbing expla-
nation for the attempts to fashion every civilian death caused by a regular 
military as a war crime.  As military forces find themselves increasingly 
under attack for alleged violations of IHL in conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Gaza, Lebanon and elsewhere, one crucial contributing factor is the mani-
pulation of international law—the very principles enshrined in the Geneva 
Conventions and customary law—to create an appearance of war crimes 
and other atrocities being committed by the United States and Israel in par-
ticular. 
This article will explore these developments through the lens of the 
Goldstone Report, the report of the U.N. fact-finding mission tasked with 
investigating alleged violations of IHL and human rights in the 2008–2009 
war in Gaza.  It will examine how the Goldstone Report contributes to—
even puts a stamp of approval on—the use of lawfare.  In particular, this 
article will examine how the misapplication of IHL in the Goldstone Report 
exacerbates the manipulation of IHL by insurgents and terrorists, who use 
the law, and Western militaries’ adherence to the law, as a tool of war in 
today’s conflicts.  Key areas include perfidy, military objectives and the 
targeting of protected objects, and the defending party’s obligations to take 
precautions to protect the civilian population.  The Goldstone Report’s ap-
proach to IHL, if followed, would facilitate and encourage such manipula-
tion of the law and, rather than leading to greater protection for civilians, 
actually produce conflict scenarios where civilians are at ever greater risk. 
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Civilian deaths in Gaza—whether during Operation Cast Lead, the 
May 31 flotilla incident, or other incidents—seem to produce immediate 
conclusions regarding Israeli war crimes and other violations of internation-
al law. Recently, we have seen similar statements in the aftermath of U.S. or 
allied attacks leading to civilian deaths in Afghanistan. International law 
recognizes, indeed accepts, that civilians will die during war, and yet we 
now see a growing trend in which every civilian death necessarily seems to 
connote a crime. Neither the growing public awareness of international law 
nor the twenty-four hour news cycle can fully explain this phenomenon.  
Instead, the increasing use of law as a tool of war, a practice termed 
―lawfare,‖ offers a more likely and more disturbing explanation for the at-
tempts to fashion every civilian death caused by a regular military as a war 
crime.1 International humanitarian law (IHL), otherwise known as the law 
of armed conflict or the laws of war, governs the conduct of both states and 
individuals during armed conflict and seeks to minimize suffering in war by 
protecting persons not participating in hostilities and by restricting the 
means and methods of warfare.2 IHL contains extensive provisions requir-
  
 1 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Val-
ues in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov‘t, 
Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web 
%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf. 
 2 See International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law in 
Brief, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_in_brief (last visited Oct. 
10, 2010). The law of armed conflict is set forth primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of 
August 14, 1949 and their Additional Protocols. See Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 
Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 
3364 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 [hereinafter GC IV]; Pro-
tocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted by Conference June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b36b4.pdf 
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ing protection of civilians and proscribing attacks that target civilians and 
indiscriminate attacks. These provisions form part of the legal doctrine of 
militaries around the world, including those of the United States, United 
Kingdom, Israel, and other Western allies.3  And yet these militaries find 
themselves increasingly under attack for alleged violations of IHL in con-
flicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Gaza, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Politics play a 
role in these developments, naturally, but one crucial contributing factor is 
the manipulation of international law—the very principles enshrined in the 
Geneva Conventions and the above-mentioned military manuals—to create 
an appearance of war crimes and other atrocities being committed by the 
United States and Israel in particular. 
This article will explore these developments through the lens of the 
Goldstone Report, the report of the U.N. fact-finding mission tasked with 
investigating alleged violations of IHL and human rights in the 2008–2009 
war in Gaza.4 The Goldstone Report presented an opportunity to examine 
critically how the law applies in complicated modern warfare and might be 
used to solve difficult problems such conflict poses. Mandated to investigate 
possible violations of IHL and human rights law during the conflict in Gaza, 
the Goldstone Report engages in a sweeping review of the conflict, as well 
as the historical underpinnings of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, human 
rights in the West Bank and in Israel proper, and Israel‘s strategic aims. 
This article will not engage in a thorough discussion of the report‘s mandate 
or the shortcomings in the report‘s application of IHL and human rights 
  
[hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
adopted by Conference June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b37f40.pdf [hereinafter AP II]. 
 3 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27– 
10: LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956), available at www.aschq.army.mil/supportingdocs/Fm27 
_10.pdf; UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT–
AMENDED TEXT (2004), available at www.mod.uk/aboutus/laws_and_regs/lawmanual/index. 
html; OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE 
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS (1992), available at http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/ 
websites/Resources/dgfda/Pubs/CF%20Joint%20Doctrine%20Publications/CF%20Joint%20 
Doctrine%20-%20B-GJ-005-104%20FP-021%20-%20LOAC%20-%20EN%20(13%20Aug 
%2001).pdf; AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PUBLICATION, INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
PLANNING MANUAL (1994), available at http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dcdm. 
pdf; THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THE OPERATION IN GAZA 27 DECEMBER 2008–18 JANUARY 2009 
(2009), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/E89E699D-A435-491B-B2D0-
017675DAFEF7/0/GazaOperation.pdf. 
 4 See generally Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied 
Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 
A/HRC/12/48, Sept. 15, 2009, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/ 
specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC_Report.pdf, [hereinafter ―Goldstone Report‖]. 
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law.5 Rather, it will examine how the Goldstone Report contributes to—
even puts a stamp of approval on—the use of lawfare. In particular, this 
article will examine how the misapplication of IHL in the Goldstone Report 
exacerbates the manipulation of IHL by insurgents and terrorists, who use 
the law, and Western militaries‘ adherence to the law, as a tool of war in 
today‘s conflicts. The Goldstone Report‘s approach to IHL, if followed, 
would facilitate and encourage such manipulation of the law and, rather 
than leading to greater protection for civilians, actually produce conflict 
scenarios where civilians are at ever-greater risk. 
Section I will provide an overview of the concept of lawfare and the 
nature of warfare in asymmetrical conflicts, and will also briefly examine 
the key principle of IHL at issue in this analysis, the principle of distinction. 
Section II will discuss the shortcomings in the Goldstone Report‘s applica-
tion of IHL and will demonstrate how those errors will actually exacerbate 
the use of lawfare and greatly undermine IHL‘s fundamental protections for 
civilians and civilian objects during armed conflict. Finally, Section III will 
explore what these challenges mean for the future, given the continuing 
trend of complex conflicts between state and non-state actors. 
I.  LAWFARE, ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS AND IHL 
A. Lawfare 
Lawfare is generally defined as ―the strategy of using or misusing 
law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve military objec-
tives.‖6 The term was first popularized in a 2002 article by Major General 
Charles Dunlap, in which he explained: 
Lawfare describes a method of warfare where law is used as a means of 
realizing a military objective. Though at first blush one might assume law-
fare would result in less suffering in war (and sometimes it does), in prac-
tice it too often produces behavior that jeopardizes the protection of the 
truly innocent. There are many dimensions to lawfare, but the one increa-
singly embraced by U.S. opponents is a cynical manipulation of the rule of 
law and the humanitarian values it represents. Rather than seeking battle-
field victories, per se, challengers try to destroy the will to fight by under-
mining the public support that is indispensable when democracies like the 
U.S. conduct military interventions. A principal way of bringing about that 
  
 5 See Laurie R. Blank, The Application of IHL in the Goldstone Report: A Critical Com-
mentary, 12 Y. B. INT‘L HUM. L. 347–402 (2009) (discussing the application of IHL in the 
Goldstone Report). 
 6 See Colonel Kelly D. Wheaton, ―Strategic Lawyering‖ Realizing the Potential of Mili-
tary Lawyers at the Strategic Level, 2006 ARMY LAW. 1, 6 (2006). 
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end is to make it appear that the U.S. is waging war in violation of the let-
ter or spirit of LOAC.
7
 
Two aspects of lawfare are relevant to the instant discussion: strategic and 
tactical. The above description of lawfare highlights the strategic aspect, in 
which technologically and militarily disadvantaged forces target public sup-
port and seek to force a political end to the fighting because of opposition to 
a seemingly extra-legal war.8 The tactical piece occurs when the disadvan-
taged side—insurgents, terrorists, etcetera—openly violate the law of war to 
gain a tactical advantage in specific operations by handicapping the ability 
of the IHL-compliant military to carry out its mission within the bounds of 
the law. 
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan abound with examples of this 
type of tactical lawfare. Storing munitions in mosques or hospitals, launch-
ing rockets from residential compounds, and generally fighting from within 
the civilian population without any distinguishing markings all create situa-
tions where an IHL-compliant military often appears forced to choose be-
tween engaging a legitimate target and endangering civilians. For example, 
Taliban militants have stored heavy weaponry in mosques and reportedly 
positioned two large anti-aircraft guns in front of the office of a major inter-
national humanitarian aid organization.9 ―By shifting soldiers and military 
equipment into civilian neighborhoods and taking refuge in mosques, arc-
heological sites and other nonmilitary facilities, Taliban forces are confront-
ing U.S. authorities with the choice of risking civilian casualties and de-
struction of treasured Afghan assets or forgoing attacks.‖10 Similarly, U.S. 
and allied forces in Iraq encountered multiple examples of insurgents using 
civilians as human shields, attacking from locations protected under IHL, 
fighting without wearing a uniform or other distinctive sign, and using pro-
tected places for weapons storage and command posts.11 Operation Desert 
  
 7 Dunlap, supra note 1. 
 8 See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN & CHRIS ANTONIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR xxiv (1994) 
(explaining that ―[i]n modern popular democracies, even a limited armed conflict requires a 
substantial base of public support. That support can erode or even reverse itself rapidly, no 
matter how worthy the political objective, if people believe that the war is being conducted in 
an unfair, inhumane, or iniquitous way.‖) (emphasis added). 
 9 See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Kevin Whitelaw, Into the Thick of Things, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Nov. 5, 2001, at 24 (―Heavy weaponry is being sheltered in several mosques to 
deter attacks. The Taliban has even placed a tank and two large antiaircraft guns under trees 
in front of the office of CARE International . . . .‖). 
 10 Bradley Graham & Vernon Loeb, Taliban Dispersal Slows U.S., WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 
2001, at A1. 
 11 See Dexter Filkins, In Taking Falluja Mosque, Victory By the Inch, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
27, 2004, at A1; Tony Perry & Rick Loomis, Mosque Targeted in Fallouja Fighting, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at A1; Coalition Forces Continue Advance Toward Baghdad (CNN 
television broadcast Mar. 24, 2003) (transcript available at http://archives.cnn.com/ 
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Storm involved similar attempts to manipulate U.S. law of war compliance. 
As the United States explained in a communication to the United Nations at 
the time, the Iraqis  
[M]oved significant amounts of military weapons and equipment into civi-
lian areas with the deliberate purpose of using innocent civilians and their 
homes as shields against attacks on legitimate military targets; [and] Iraqi 
fighter and bomber aircraft were dispersed into villages near military air-
fields where they were parked between civilian houses and even placed 
immediately adjacent to important archaeological sites and historic trea-
sures.
12
  
Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli military operation in Gaza in 2008–2009, 
faced the same challenges: Palestinian militants hid or stored rockets, mis-
siles, and other munitions in mosques, hospitals, schools, and other civilian 
buildings.13 
All of these examples of lawfare impact the fundamental IHL prin-
ciple of distinction, discussed below. Thus, ―the most typical and also most 
damaging form of lawfare in recent conflicts has been the decision of disad-
vantaged combatants to not distinguish themselves from the local popu-
lace.‖14 By hiding amongst otherwise protected persons and objects, such 
fighters take advantage of the more advantaged military‘s compliance with 
IHL principles and obligations, using both the law and the presence of civi-
lian persons and objects as a tactical weapon. 
B.   The Principle of Distinction 
The principle of distinction, one of the ―cardinal principles of 
IHL,‖15 requires that any party to a conflict distinguish between those who 
  
TRANSCRIPTS/0303/24/se.17.html); The Rules of War are Foreign to Saddam, OTTAWA 
CITIZEN, Mar. 25, 2003; David Blair, Human Shields Disillusioned with Saddam, Leave Iraq 
after Dubious Postings, NATIONAL POST (Canada), Mar. 4, 2003, available at 
http://www.FPinfomart.ca. 
 12 Letter dated March 5, 1991 from the Permanent Rep. of United States of America to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22341 (Mar. 
8, 1991). 
 13 ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE ―GAZA WAR‖: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 24, Center for 
Strategic & International Studies (Feb. 2, 2009) (describing how Hamas used a mosque to 
store Grad missiles and Qassam rockets), available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/ 
090202_gaza_war.pdf; Jeffrey Fleishman, Charges Fly in Battle Over What Happened in 
Gaza, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A1 (detailing how Hamas used a bunker beneath a hos-
pital as a headquarters). 
 14 Eric Talbot Jensen, The ICJ’s ―Uganda Wall‖: A Barrier to the Principle of Distinction 
and An Entry Point for Lawfare, 35 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 241, 270 (2007). 
 15 Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opi-
nion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons] (Higgins, J. dissenting on 
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are fighting and those who are not and direct attacks solely at the former.16 
Similarly, parties must distinguish between civilian objects and military 
objects and target only the latter. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I sets 
forth the basic rule:  
[I]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population 
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian ob-
jects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations 
only against military objectives.
17
 
Distinction lies at the core of IHL‘s seminal goal of protecting in-
nocent civilians and persons who are hors de combat. This purpose is em-
phasized in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which states that ―[t]he civi-
lian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the ob-
ject of attack.‖18 The obligation to distinguish forms part of the customary 
international law of both international and non-international armed con-
flicts, as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) held in the Tadic case.19 As a result, all parties to any conflict are 
  
unrelated grounds) (declaring that distinction and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering 
are the two cardinal principles of international humanitarian law).  
 16 Distinction was first set forth in Article 22 of the Lieber Code: ―Nevertheless, as civili-
zation has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in 
war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and 
the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more ac-
knowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much 
as the exigencies of war will admit.‖ Francis Lieber, War Department, Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field art. 22 (1863), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument [hereinafter Lieber Code].  A few 
short years later, the international community reinforced the rule in the St. Petersburg Decla-
ration, which stated that ―the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to ac-
complish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.‖ Declaration Renouncing 
the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, preamble, 
Nov. 29 (Dec. 11), 1868, reprinted in 1 AJIL Supp. 95;  see also 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS 
& LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (2005) [he-
reinafter CIHL] (description of the concept of distinction in Rule 1). 
 17 Article 48 is considered customary international law. See AP I, supra note 2, art. 48; see 
also CIHL, supra note 16, Rule 1. 
 18 AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(2). 
 19 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 110, 127 (citing U.N. General Assembly Resolution 
2675: ―Bearing in mind the need for measures to ensure the better protection of human rights 
in armed conflicts of all types, [ . . . the General Assembly] Affirms the following basic prin-
ciples for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, without prejudice to their 
future elaboration within the framework of progressive development of the international law 
of armed conflict: . . . 2. In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a dis-
tinction must be made at all times between persons actively taking part in the hostilities and 
civilian populations.‖); See also Nuclear Weapons, supra note 15, ¶ 79 (distinction is one of 
the ―intransgressible principles of international customary law‖); CIHL, supra note 16, at 3 
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obligated to distinguish between combatants, or fighters, and civilians, and 
concomitantly, to distinguish themselves from civilians and their own mili-
tary objects from civilian objects. 
C.  Asymmetrical Conflicts20 
Modern warfare is increasingly characterized by asymmetry in the 
military capabilities of the parties. ―Wars between powerful states, those 
conflicts that prompted the development of humanitarian law, are increa-
singly rare. Instead of large-scale combat between organized militaries, 
modern warfare is becoming asymmetrical.‖21 As such asymmetry grows, 
the ―disadvantaged party has an incentive to blur the distinction between its 
forces and the civilian population in the hope that this will deter the other 
side from attack.‖22  
Contemporary conflicts thus pose particular challenges for distinc-
tion precisely because of the lack of boundaries between conflict areas and 
civilian areas, between those actively participating in hostilities and those 
who are not. U.S. and NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have been 
wrestling with the difficult legal and moral questions contemporary conflict 
raises for nearly a decade and continue to face complicated questions about 
who to target, how to target, and when to target. For example, as one news 
article explained about combat in Afghanistan: 
[T]he elusive insurgents blend easily into the population, invisible to Ma-
rines until they pick up a weapon. They use villagers to spot and warn of 
U.S. troop movements, take up positions in farmers‘ homes and fields, and 
attack Marines from spots with ready escape routes. The Marines, under 
strict rules to protect civilians, must wait for insurgents to attack and then 
attempt to ensnare them. Limited in their use of airstrikes and artillery—
because of the danger to civilians and because aircraft often frighten the 
  
(Rule 1); Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm‘n H.R., Report No. 55/97, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 178 (1997). 
 20 Asymmetrical warfare is generally used to describe ―a situation where an adversary can 
take advantage of its strengths or an opponent‘s weaknesses.‖ ROGER W. BARNETT, 
ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE: TODAY‘S CHALLENGE TO U.S. MILITARY POWER 15 (2003).  In 
―the modern context, asymmetrical warfare emphasizes what are popularly perceived as 
unconventional or nontraditional methodologies.‖  Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Virtuous Warrior 
in a Savage World, 8 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 71, 72 (1997). 
 21 Gabriel Swiney, Saving Lives: The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of Modern 
War, 39 INT‘L L. 733, 743 (2005). 
 22 Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact of High Tech and Low Tech Warfare on Distinction, in 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 21ST CENTURY‘S CONFLICTS: CHANGES AND 
CHALLENGES 169, 178 (Roberta Arnold & Pierre-Antoine Hildbrand eds., 2005). 
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Taliban away—Marine riflemen must use themselves as bait and then en-
gage in the riskier task of pursuing insurgents on foot.
23
  
Similarly, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi insurgents com-
monly wore civilian clothing when approaching American and British 
forces in order to get closer without seeming to present a threat.24 Perhaps 
most nefariously, insurgent groups that employ suicide bombing as a tactic 
have now turned to the use of women and children, for they have proven 
more likely to evade measures designed to identify suicide bombers.25 In all 
of these situations, when those who are fighting (insurgents, guerrillas, ter-
rorists, or comparable terms) melt into the civilian population and persons 
who appear to be civilians periodically engage in hostilities, determining 
who is a legitimate target becomes nearly impossible. 
Indeed, the great fluidity between hostile persons and innocent civi-
lians and the conscious blending of hostile persons into the civilian popula-
tion makes a soldier‘s task nearly impossible.26 For example, a soldier man-
ning a checkpoint sees a jeep speeding toward him. It could be civilians 
seeking aid or fleeing from danger, or it could be insurgents bent on driving 
the vehicle into the checkpoint as a suicide bomb. The soldier who reacts 
too soon and fires on the jeep risks killing innocent civilians; the soldier 
who waits too long to make a positive identification risks dying in a fiery 
explosion.27 Neither choice is acceptable from a tactical or legal standpoint. 
Insurgents take advantage of this dilemma every day to gain an edge over 
the superior fighting capabilities of state forces. In Afghanistan, for exam-
ple, the Taliban regularly ―use a tactic of engaging coalition forces from 
  
 23 Ann Scott Tyson, In Afghanistan, a Test of Tactics Under Strict Rules to Protect Civi-
lians, Marines Face More Complex Missions, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2009, at A6. 
 24 Id. See also Official: Afghan Militants Fled Dressed as Women, CNN.COM, July 6, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/06/afghanistan.marine.standoff/index.html. 
 25 See, e.g., Pakistan: Taliban Buying Children for Suicide Attacks, CNN.COM (July 7, 
2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/07/pakistan.child.bombers/index. 
html (explaining that ―young suicide bombers may be able to reach targets unnoticed‖);  
Cassandra Clifford, The Battle for Suicide Bombers, FOREIGN POL‘Y BLOGS NETWORK, (Jan. 
8, 2010), http://children.foreignpolicyblogs.com/category/suicide-bombers/; Child Bombers-
in-Training Arrested in Iraq, UPI.COM, (April 21, 2009, 11:14 AM), http://www.upi.com/ 
Top_News/2009/04/21/Child-bombers-in-training-arrested-in-Iraq/UPI-48761240326883/; 
Dan Abrams, Turning a Blind Eye to Child Suicide Bombers, MSNBC.COM (March 26, 2004, 
11:37:21 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4601244. 
 26 Laurie R. Blank & Amos N. Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationaliz-
ing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT‘L SEC. J. 45, 65–66 (2010). 
 27 See, e.g., Suicide Bomber Attacks Afghan Army Base, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, at 
A10 (describing how a suicide car bomber tried to drive into the army base, was stopped at 
the gate and then detonated his explosives at the gate, killing one soldier and wounding five 
other people); see also Amos N. Guiora, Teaching Morality in Armed Conflict: The Israel 
Defense Forces Model, 18 JEWISH POL. STUD. REV. 1, 3 (2006). 
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positions that expose Afghan civilians to danger.‖28 This tactic is designed 
to force U.S. troops to either hold their fire in the face of an attack or en-
danger innocent civilians, a lose-lose situation. By not distinguishing them-
selves from civilians—thus violating the principle of distinction—these 
militants deliberately create such situations. 
Israel‘s conflicts, particularly with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 
and with Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups in Gaza in December 
2008—January 2009, offer perhaps the most searing commentary about the 
nature of asymmetrical war. Indeed, in the Gaza Strip, ―one of the most 
densely populated tracts of land in the world,‖ where militants intermingle 
with the civilian population, store munitions in residential buildings, hospit-
als and mosques, and launch rockets from farmers‘ fields and residential 
rooftops, the implementation of IHL faces one of its gravest tests. 29 Israeli 
troops, faced with Hamas militants firing from schools, storing munitions in 
mosques and using hospitals as command posts, face the same challenging 
decisions as U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, rather than examine 
critically how the law applies in complicated contemporary conflicts and 
how to use the law to solve difficult problems that arise, the Goldstone Re-
port misapplied and misconstrued IHL in ways that only exacerbate the use 
of lawfare and threaten the vital goal of protecting civilians in combat 
zones. 
II.  THE GOLDSTONE REPORT‘S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DANGERS OF 
LAWFARE 
Conflicts that know no differentiation between the traditional battle-
field and populated urban areas and pit states against non-state actors create 
a natural inclination to focus on the innocent civilian casualties and the civi-
lian infrastructure that endures significant damage. In Gaza, both Hamas 
tactics and the urban environment in which most of the relevant military 
operations occurred demonstrate how this natural focus can be manipulated 
  
 28 Jim Garamone, Directive Re-emphasizes Protecting Afghan Civilians, AM. FORCES 
PRESS SERVICE (July 6, 2009), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123157435; see also 
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN, HUMAN RIGHTS UNIT MID YEAR 
BULLETIN ON PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 35 (2009),  
http://unama.unmissions.org/portals/unama/human%20rights/09july31-unama-human-rights-
civilian-casualties-mid-year-2009-bulletin.pdf (―In several cases investigated by UNAMA, it 
is apparent that important traditional codes of hospitality and power imbalances inhibit the 
ability of villagers living in areas with a strong [anti-government element] presence to refuse 
shelter to an [anti-government element] commander or his men. Information indicates that 
[anti-government elements] take advantage of these factors to use civilian houses as cover, to 
deter [pro-government force] raids, or to increase the likelihood of civilian casualties if 
raided by [pro-government forces], potentially violating international humanitarian law.‖). 
 29 Key Maps, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/ 
v3_israel_palestinians/maps/html/population_settlements.stm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
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and perverted into a tactic in specific operations and an all too effective 
strategy impacting an entire operation. Indeed, the challenges presented in 
that conflict are emblematic of some of the most difficult dilemmas asym-
metrical warfare poses, dilemmas that place both soldiers and innocent civi-
lians at grave risk every day.  
Instead of engaging in a careful and precise analysis of how the law 
applies and grappling with these very difficulties, however, the Goldstone 
Report seemingly ignores these challenges and applies IHL simplistically, 
incorrectly, and in a manner that only encourages the abuse of the law for 
tactical and strategic purposes in future conflicts. Three areas of the report 
that raise particular concern regarding the use of lawfare are perfidy, the 
designation of military objectives and precautions. The report‘s goals ap-
pear to be greater protection for civilians during conflict; unfortunately, the 
impact of its misapplication of IHL and encouragement of lawfare is that 
civilians will consistently be at greater risk as a result. 
A. Perfidy 
The traditional definition of perfidy is ―[t]o kill or wound treacher-
ously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army,‖ as set forth in 
Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Convention. 30 Suicide bombers disguising 
themselves as civilians to gain closer access to military checkpoints or other 
locations are a prime example of killing ―treacherously.‖ Article 37(1) of 
Additional Protocol I offers a more comprehensive formulation, forbidding 
killing, capturing or injuring the enemy ―by resort to perfidy.‖31 In particu-
lar, the Protocol states that ―[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to 
lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection 
under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent 
to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy.‖32 Based on notions of 
honor, this prohibition unquestionably forms part of customary international 
law.33  
  
 30 Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, U.S.T.S. 539 [hereinafter Hague IV].  The prohibition on killing treach-
erously dates back to the Lieber Code, which states that military necessity ―admits of decep-
tion, but disclaims acts of perfidy.‖ Lieber Code, supra note 16, art. 16. 
 31 AP I, supra note 2, art. 37(1). Examples of perfidy in Article 37(1)(a)–(d) include feign-
ing truce or surrender, feigning civilian status, or feigning protected status by using emblems 
of the United Nations or neutral states. 
 32 AP I, supra note 2, art. 37(1) (emphasis added). 
 33 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
199 (2004); Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian 
Law, 62 A.F.L. REV. 1, 22–3 (2008), (citing to NWP 1–14M, ¶ 12.7); U.S. ARMY JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL‘S SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 192 (2005); SAN REMO MANUAL 
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (1995) (Rule 111); see 
also CIHL, supra note 16, 221–26 (Rule 65). 
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The Commentary to the Additional Protocols (the ―Commentary‖) 
explains that ―[t]he central element of the definition of perfidy is the delibe-
rate claim to legal protection for hostile purposes. The enemy attacks under 
cover of the protection accorded by humanitarian law.‖34 Thus, when figh-
ters intentionally disguise themselves as civilians in order to lead soldiers on 
the opposing side to believe that they need not take defensive action to 
guard against attack, they commit perfidy. The indirect consequence of such 
actions is that civilians are placed at greater risk, since soldiers previously 
attacked by fighters disguised as civilians may be more likely to view those 
who appear to be civilians as dangerous and respond accordingly.  
Notwithstanding the nature of Hamas‘s tactics and the combat in-
volved in Operation Cast Lead, the Goldstone Report does not even mention 
perfidy in discussing the activities of Hamas and other armed groups,35 an 
unfortunate omission. During Operation Cast Lead, Palestinian armed 
groups generally operated in civilian clothes and from civilian areas, enabl-
ing them to take advantage of the protections IHL affords civilians. The 
Goldstone Report discusses such behavior only in the context of human 
shielding, itself a violation of IHL.36 Rather than reprise the debate over 
human shields, however, this section will focus on how the report‘s omis-
sion of perfidy contributes to the use of lawfare.  
The Goldstone Report does state that Palestinian armed groups fired 
rockets and mortars from urban areas, citing, for example, a January 2009 
interview with three Palestinian militants in which they stated that ―rockets 
and mortars were launched in close proximity to homes and alleyways ‗in 
the hope that nearby civilians would deter Israel from responding.‘‖37 Simi-
larly, the report recognizes that members of Palestinian armed groups did 
not wear uniforms. Instead, after the start of military operations, ―members 
of al-Qassam Brigades abandoned military dress and patrolled streets ‗in 
  
 34 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUG 1949, ¶ 1500 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarki & Bruno Zim-
merman eds., 1987) [hereinafter PROTOCOL COMMENTARY] (explaining that the ―definition is 
based on three elements: inviting the confidence of an adversary, the intent to betray that 
confidence (subjective element) and to betray it on a specific point, the existence of the pro-
tection afforded by international law applicable in armed conflict (objective element).‖). 
 35 The word ―perfidy‖ appears three times in the Goldstone Report, all in paragraph 1102, 
addressing the alleged practice of Israeli troops urging militants to exit a building because the 
ICRC was present. See Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 1102. 
 36 See AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(7) (―The presence or movements of the civilian popula-
tion or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from 
military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to 
shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the 
movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield mili-
tary objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.‖). 
 37 Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 450–51. 
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civilian clothes.‘‖38 What the report fails to mention, however, is that the 
Palestinian militants were not just shielding the mortars from attack, but 
were attacking—firing mortars and rockets—while in civilian dress and 
while feigning civilian status, the fundamental element of perfidy.39 ―A 
combatant who takes part in an attack, or in a military operation preparatory 
to an attack, can use camouflage and make himself virtually invisible 
against a natural or man-made background, but he may not feign civilian 
status and hide amongst a crowd.‖40 Militants who wear civilian dress in 
order to launch attacks while benefitting from the protection of apparent 
civilian status are thus guilty of perfidy.  
The failure to adequately explore what appears to have been the use 
of perfidious—and therefore unlawful—tactics, regardless of whether spe-
cific situations on the ground actually constituted perfidy once thoroughly 
investigated, demonstrates a disregard for the complexities of asymmetrical 
warfare. From the soldier‘s perspective, all persons appear to be civilians, 
and yet some are acutely dangerous even though dressed like innocent civil-
ians. Recognizing that the soldier‘s obligation to somehow distinguish be-
tween this individual and the truly innocent individuals deserving of protec-
tion is unwavering under IHL, we must then consider how to improve the 
soldier‘s ability to do just that. The Goldstone Report instead effectively 
chooses to tell the soldier that the non-state actors can dress like innocent 
civilians—thus gaining protection from attack—and attack him while so 
disguised—thus granting him no warning or ability to protect himself. By 
upending IHL‘s delicate balance between military necessity and humanity, 
the Goldstone Report offers those who use lawfare‘s unlawful tactics un-
warranted protection from the law. In fact, the report essentially encourages 
militants to embed themselves within the civilian population. 
At its core, the report‘s acceptance of the militants‘ practice of dis-
guising themselves as civilians suggests that: (1) it also accepts that non-
state parties will fight using perfidious tactics and (2) it believes militaries 
and the international community should accept that practice as well. The 
true victims of this mistaken approach are the innocent civilians. First, they 
are trapped—literally and figuratively—in the conflict zone by fighters us-
ing them as shields and as cover for their perfidious tactics.  Second, they 
become the unintentional and tragic targets of soldiers who mistake them 
  
 38 Id., ¶ 478. 
 39 See, e.g., Int‘l Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, Legal Aspects of Suicide Attacks 
in IHL, MONITORING IHL IN IRAQ (Apr. 6, 2003) IHLRESEARCH.ORG, available at  
http://web.archive.org/web/20030626085305/www.ihlresearch.org/iraq/feature.php?a=19 
(―However, the fact that the attackers in recent suicide operations have posed as civilians and 
therefore concealed their combatant status constitutes an act of perfidy prohibited under 
IHL.‖). 
 40 PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 1507. 
File: Blank 2 Created on:  12/2/2010 5:17:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:04:00 PM 
292 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. [Vol. 43:279 
for legitimate targets when unable to distinguish between fighters and civil-
ians. 
B.  Military Objectives 
Beyond the obligation to differentiate between innocent civilians 
and persons who are fighting (and therefore can be targeted), the principle 
of distinction requires comparable determinations regarding the targeting of 
objects. The obligation to target only military objectives is one means of 
implementing the age-old principle that the means and methods of warfare 
are not unlimited.41 Operation Cast Lead, even more than other asymmetric-
al conflicts, demonstrated the complexities of determining when buildings 
and other objects constitute military objectives. Like insurgents and other 
fighters in Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iraq, Hamas and other armed groups 
in Gaza used the civilian infrastructure extensively to hide, store, and launch 
rockets, missiles, and other weapons. In any conflict, such conduct makes 
targeting decisions extraordinarily difficult given the obligations to minim-
ize civilian casualties and operate within the framework of proportionality. 
In densely populated Gaza, the demands and dangers increase exponential-
ly. 
Article 52 of Additional Protocol I sets forth the definition of mili-
tary objectives: 
[T]hose objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an ef-
fective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruc-
tion, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, of-
fers a definite military advantage.
42
 
Nature, location, and use or purpose are the main criteria. Nature refers to 
―all objects directly used by the armed forces: weapons, equipment, trans-
ports, fortifications, depots, buildings occupied by armed forces, staff head-
  
 41 The modern version of this principle appears in AP I, supra note 2, art. 35; earlier for-
mulations appear in the writings of Vitoria, Grotius, and Vattel, as well as in early codifica-
tions of the laws of war. See AP I, supra note 2, art. 35; CIHL supra note 16; FRANCISCUS DE 
VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI REFLECTIONES (John Pawley Bate trans., Ocean Publi-
cations 1964) (1557); HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 3 (Francis W. Kelsey 
trans., Oceana Publications 1964) (1646); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU 
PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE, APPLIQUÉS À LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS 
ET DES SOUVERAINS (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1916) 
(1785); FRANCIS LIEBER, LL.D., INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, art. 16 (1898); DECLARATION RENOUNCING THE USE, IN TIME OF 
WAR, OF EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILES UNDER 400 GRAMMES WEIGHT, preamble, Nov. 29 (Dec. 
11), 1868, reprinted in 1 AJIL Supp. 95; THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON 
LAND, art. 4 (1880 Oxford Manual). 
 42 AP I, supra note 2, article 52(2). 
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quarters, communications centres etc.‖43 Location is an important factor 
because certain objects, such as bridges, make a direct contribution to mili-
tary action regardless of whether they have a military function. Finally, use 
and purpose refer respectively to an object‘s present or intended function. 
The Commentary explains that many civilian objects are or become useful 
to the armed forces. ―Thus, for example, a school or a hotel is a civilian 
object, but if . . . used to accommodate troops or headquarters staff, [it will] 
become [a] military objective [].‖For example, during Operation Iraqi Free-
dom, the United States attacked, among other buildings, the Baath Party 
Headquarters, which at first blush appeared to be a civilian object. Yet Iraqi 
forces were firing at the U.S. troops from within and near the building, and 
a weapons cache was subsequently found inside the facility.44 This episode 
shows how actual use is a critical component to understanding whether a 
building is a legitimate target. Even though the Protocol emphasizes, impor-
tantly, that all doubts as to the civilian or military nature of an object should 
be resolved in favor of civilian status, the actual use of a building must be 
taken into account in targeting determinations. 
The Goldstone Report‘s analysis of Israeli attacks on hospitals and 
mosques highlights one key shortcoming in how it assesses military objec-
tives. Like the omission of perfidy, the report‘s errors in assessing military 
objectives in this area contribute to the use of lawfare and the corresponding 
endangerment of civilians. Normally protected under international law, 
these buildings lose their immunity from attack if used for military purpos-
es. For example, Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention sets forth the 
obligation to refrain from attacking—and to protect—civilian hospitals.45 
Article 19 then states that ―the protection to which civilian hospitals are 
entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their huma-
nitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.‖46 Launching rockets from or 
storing munitions in a hospital clearly qualify. Similarly, Hague Convention 
IV recognizes limits on the protection of cultural and religious buildings:  
[i]n sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, 
as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable 
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and 
  
 43 PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 2020. 
 44 Michael N. Schmitt, Conduct of Hostilities During Operation Iraqi Freedom: An Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Assessment, 6 Y.B. INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L. 73, 96 n.119 (2003) 
(citing U.S. CENT. COMMAND News Release No. 03-03-105, U.S. Marines Destroy Ba’ath 
Party Headquarters (Mar. 31, 2003)). 
 45 GC IV, supra note 2, art. 18 (―Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded 
and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack but 
shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.‖). 
 46 Id. art. 19; see also PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 1948 (―[P]urely civilian 
objects may in combat conditions become military objectives.‖). 
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wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for 
military purposes.
47
  
Hamas used hospitals, schools, mosques, residential houses, and 
other civilian objects extensively for the storage of weapons, firing of rock-
ets, and other military purposes.48 In fact, Hamas does not have a ―war min-
istry‖ or many other identifiable military locations—because it deliberately 
comingles military and civilian buildings and objects. Conflicts in Afgha-
nistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, among others, also involved similar use of pro-
tected objects by insurgents and other fighters.49 During Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, for example, human rights organizations condemned the Iraqi 
practice of using hospitals and mosques for military uses. Emphasizing that 
such use was illegal under IHL, Human Rights Watch‘s report Off Target 
explains that the ―protection ceases [when] medical establishments are used 
to commit ‗acts harmful to the enemy.‘ By using hospitals as military head-
quarters, Iraqi forces turned them into military objectives.‖50  
The Goldstone Report addresses several examples of Israeli target-
ing of erstwhile-protected objects. In assessing the Israeli shelling of the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) school, the Goldstone 
Report does consider that Palestinian armed groups were firing at Israeli 
forces from near the school in determining whether the school, or at least 
the area near the school, was a legitimate target. In other cases, however, the 
Goldstone Report fails to mention that use of otherwise civilian objects for 
military purposes causes such objects to lose their immunity from attack. 
For example, the only comments the report makes about the use of mosques 
  
 47 See Hague IV, supra note 30, art. 30. See also Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-
01-42-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 310, (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/48ad42092.pdf (stating that ―the protection 
accorded to cultural property is lost where such property is used for military purposes.‖). 
 48 See CORDESMAN, supra note 13, at 43–47, 49, 51–52, 54–55 (describing how Hamas 
uses mosques, houses and cemeteries for military operations and to store weapons). 
 49 See Filkins, supra note 11; Carlotta Gall, Americans Face Rising Threat from Taliban, 
INT‘L HERALD TRIBUNE, July 15, 2008; Jeremy Rabkin, The Fantasy World of International 
Law: The Criticism of Israel Has Been Disproportionate, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 21, 2006; 
Department of Defense Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (1992), 
available at http://www.nduedu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf [hereinafter Gulf War Final Report]; 
Permanent Rep. of United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated March 5, 1991 from 
the Permanent Rep. of United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Pres-
ident of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22341 (Mar. 8, 1991) (explaining that the Iraqis 
―moved significant amounts of military weapons and equipment into civilian areas with the 
deliberate purpose of using innocent civilians and their homes as shields against attacks on 
legitimate military targets‖ and ―Iraqi fighter and bomber aircraft were dispersed into vil-
lages near military airfields where they were parked between civilian houses and even placed 
immediately adjacent to important archaeological sites and historic treasures.‖). 
 50 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET: THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CIVILIAN 
CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 73 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203. 
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to store weapons or as a location from which to launch attacks refer to the 
obligation of Palestinian armed groups to refrain from conducting attacks 
from civilian buildings.51 It further states that ―it could not exclude that Pal-
estinian armed groups engaged in combat activities in the vicinity of‖ hos-
pitals and other protected sites, nor could it exclude that they may have used 
―mosques for military purposes or to shield military activities.‖52 Given that 
it claims a lack of the necessary information, it may well be understandable 
that the report did not reach definitive conclusions regarding violations of 
those obligations. However, the failure to specifically state the law regard-
ing the loss of protected status for civilian objects used for military purposes 
is a grave oversight that shows a fundamental failure to assess the law in 
light of the nature of combat in Gaza and other asymmetrical conflicts.  
More problematic, the impact of the report‘s oversight here is to 
suggest—indeed conclude—that attacks on protected objects are still crimes 
even if the objects have legitimately lost their protection. Even though the 
report makes an attempt at criticizing the unlawful use of protected objects 
for military purposes, its concomitant willingness to condemn attacks on 
such buildings simply undoes any such criticism and ratifies the militants‘ 
practices. The effect can only be that insurgents, terrorists, and other mili-
tants continue to use protected objects as launching sites, command posts, 
and munitions depots, endangering the civilians who frequent such 
mosques, hospitals, and schools and depend on the services they provide. 
C.   Precautions 
In pursuit of the goal of protecting civilians and those hors de com-
bat from unnecessary suffering in war, IHL imposes obligations to take 
―constant care‖ during military operations to protect the civilian popula-
tion.53 Thus, in addition to the rules governing legitimate targets of attack 
and methods of warfare, the law mandates that parties take certain precau-
tionary measures to protect civilians. In contemporary conflicts, where 
combat takes place in urban areas and civilians in essence live, work, and 
play in the combat zone, these precautions are critical to the protection of 
civilians during conflict. 
The Goldstone Report addresses precautions taken by both Israel 
and Palestinian armed groups, with a significantly greater factual and legal 
emphasis on the former. In so doing, the report interprets the law in ways 
that pose grave consequences for future conflicts, again by encouraging the 
use of lawfare tactics. First, the report applies an unduly strict standard for 
the obligation to issue advance warning of attacks. Second, the report‘s mi-
  
 51 Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 498. 
 52 Id. ¶ 495. 
 53 AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(1). 
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nimalist standards for the obligations of defending parties to offer protec-
tions for their own civilians would, if followed, leave civilian populations 
even more vulnerable to the dangers of modern warfare. Both of these 
shortcomings in the Goldstone Report enable and exacerbate the use of law-
fare and, in so doing, place civilians and civilian objects in greater danger in 
the combat zone. 
1. Precautions in attack: effective advance warning 
Precautions are, understandably, a critical component of the law‘s 
efforts to protect civilians. For this reason, even if a target is legitimate un-
der the laws of war, failure to take precautions can make an attack on that 
target unlawful.54 Article 57 of Additional Protocol I sets forth the precau-
tions that attacking parties must take. First, parties must refrain from 
launching attacks that violate the principle of proportionality.55 Parties also 
must do everything feasible to ensure that targets are military objectives and 
must choose the means and methods of attack with the aim of minimizing 
incidental civilian losses and damage.56 When choosing between two possi-
ble attacks offering similar military advantage, parties must choose the ob-
jective that offers the least likely harm to civilians and civilian objects.57 
Finally, article 57(2)(c) mandates that ―effective advance warning shall be 
given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circums-
tances do not permit.‖58 With particular relevance to the conflict in Gaza, 
the Commentary emphasizes that these precautions ―will be of greatest im-
portance in urban areas because such areas are most densely populated.‖59 
The main purpose of warnings is to give civilians an opportunity to 
leave and find a place of greater safety. Article 26 of the Regulations an-
nexed to the 1907 Hague Convention is the most oft-cited statement of the 
obligation to warn: ―[t]he officer in command of an attacking force must, 
  
 54 See, e.g., Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 847 (2005), available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4223422f6.html (holding that a Russian aerial as-
sault on the village of Katyr-Yurt violated the right to life in Article 2 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights because the military continued its aerial bombardment of the vil-
lage and its outskirts even as the civilians tried to leave via a safe passage corridor.) The 
Court found no evidence that, although the attack may have been against a legitimate tar-
get—insurgents entrenched in the village—―it was planned and executed with the requisite 
care for the lives of the civilian population.‖ Id. ¶ 200. Although the ECHR applied the hu-
man rights framework and analysis of Article 2(2) of the European Convention rather than 
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, the court‘s analysis is comparable and offers useful in-
formation for understanding when the failure to take precautions will make an attack unlaw-
ful. 
 55 AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b). 
 56 Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i). 
 57 Id. art. 57(3). 
 58 Id. art. 57(2)(c). 
 59 PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 2190. 
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before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his 
power to warn the authorities.‖60 Like Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Proto-
col I, this requirement provides a practical limitation taking into account the 
circumstances and the feasibility of issuing such a warning. In essence, the 
obligation to warn is not absolute and can be avoided if issuing a warning 
would seriously compromise the chances of success, such as in the case of a 
surprise attack.61  
Recent international jurisprudence emphasizes that the obligation 
extends to those precautions that are feasible in the circumstances, given the 
information available to the commanders and military planners. Among 
other incidents during the 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, 
the committee investigating the bombing examined NATO‘s attack on Kori-
sa, a village near Pristina, where 87 civilians, mostly refugees, died when 
NATO attacked a Serbian military camp and command post near the vil-
lage. After examining the pilot‘s efforts to identify the target and the sur-
rounding area, including the identified military characteristics of the ve-
hicles and buildings, the committee accepted NATO‘s position that ―all 
practicable precautions were taken‖ and recognizing that the pilot and air 
controllers took appropriate steps to identify the target, the committee de-
termined that no violation of the law occurred.62 The Ethiopia-Eritrea 
Claims Commission took a similar approach, finding that, ―[b]y ‗feasible,‘ 
Article 57 means those measures that are practicable or practically possible, 
taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time.‖63 IHL contains no 
further guidance to help understand what actions make a warning ―effec-
tive,‖ but state practice supports the Commentary‘s view that ―[w]arnings 
may also have a general character.‖64 Examples in the Commentary include 
giving notice by radio of attacks on certain types of facilities or providing a 
list of objectives to be attacked.65  
  
 60 Hague IV, supra note 30, art. 26. 
 61 DINSTEIN, supra note 33, at 126 (―[p]alpably, no absolute certainty can be guaranteed in 
the process of ascertaining the military character of an objective selected for attack, but there 
is an obligation of due diligence and acting in good faith‖). 
 62 Int‘l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Final Report to the Prosecu-
tor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, reprinted in 39 INT‘L LEGAL MATERIALS 1257, 1281–82 (2000). 
 63 Ethiopia v. Eritrea, Western and Eastern Fronts, Ethiopia‘s claims 1 & 3, Partial Award, 
¶ 33 (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/ 
files/FINAL%20ET%20FRONT%20CLAIMS%281%29.pdf. 
 64 PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 2225; see also Id.¶ 2224 (giving examples 
from WWII of warnings by radio, by pamphlets and by flying low over the objectives to give 
civilians time to leave). 
 65 In the 1991 Gulf War, for example, the U.S. military dropped leaflets to warn before 
attacks in Basra, Faw, Zubair, Tannuwa, and Abdul Khasib, among other cities. See C.B. 
Shotwell, Economy and Humanity in the Use of Force: A Look at the Aerial Rules of En-
gagement in the 1991 Gulf War, 4 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL. STUD. 15, 36 (1993); see also 
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The Goldstone Report sets forth several criteria to determine 
whether a warning is effective: 
[I]t must reach those who are likely to be in danger from the planned at-
tack, it must give them sufficient time to react to the warning, it must 
clearly explain what they should do to avoid harm and it must be a credi-
ble warning. The warning also has to be clear so that the civilians are not 
in doubt that it is indeed addressed to them. As far as possible, warnings 
should state the location to be affected and where the civilians should seek 
safety. A credible warning means that civilians should be in no doubt that 
it is intended to be acted upon.
66
 
Although these criteria may seem reasonable at first glance, in actually ap-
plying them, the report diverges from the general understanding of and state 
practice regarding warnings in two ways that are particularly problematic in 
the arena of lawfare.  
First, the report‘s standard for measuring the ―effectiveness‖ of 
warnings is unduly high. According to the Israeli Government, and as stated 
in the report, Israel‘s warnings consisted of: 165,000 telephone calls, 
300,000 warning notes on December 28, 2008 alone, 2,500,000 leaflets 
overall, radio broadcasts, and roof-knocking.67 After detailing the content of 
the leaflet and radio broadcast warnings, the report concludes that the warn-
ings were not sufficient because Israel had the capability to issue more ef-
fective warnings, civilians in Gaza were uncertain about whether and where 
to go for safety, and some places of shelter were struck after the warnings 
were issued.
68
 As a simple factual matter, this conclusion that warnings far 
exceeding those given in any other conflict are insufficient is patently un-
reasonable on its face.  
In addition, while Israel certainly has capabilities far superior to 
those of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups, IHL applies equally to 
  
CIHL, supra note 16, ¶ 483 (citing United States, Message from the Department of the Army 
to the Legal Advisor of the U.S. Army Forces Deployed in the Gulf, 11 January 1991, § 8(I), 
in which the United States responded to ICRC queries by stating that ―a warning need not be 
specific; it may be a blanket warning, delivered by leaflets and/or radio, advising the civilian 
population of an enemy nation to avoid remaining in proximity to military objectives.‖). 
Similarly, Israel has used leaflets, telephone calls and radio broadcasts in the past. W. Hays 
Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 166 (1990); Emanuel Gross, Use of 
Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged By 
a Democratic State Against Terrorism? 16 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 445, 497 (2002); Suzanne 
Goldberg, Israel Launches Rocket Attacks After Frantic Mob Murders Soldiers, THE 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 13, 2000, at 1. 
 66 Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 528. 
 67 Id., para. 498–9. Roof-knocking is a new technology the Israelis developed in which 
they fire light explosives at rooftops to warn the residents inside of an impending attack.  The 
explosives merely make a noise and do not explode. 
 68 Goldstone Report, supra note 4, at 125–33. 
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belligerents regardless of capability.69 The wording of Article 57(2)(c) 
speaks to feasibility, not capability, and does not require the attacking party 
to exhaust all possible means to warn. By qualifying Israel‘s obligations 
based on its capabilities, the Goldstone Report exacerbates the already-
present tendency towards ―a capabilities-based IHL regime,‖ an approach 
that only legitimizes the types of lawfare highlighted in the present article. 70 
In fact, IHL is not about a fair fight and condoning the use of lawfare to 
―even the playing field‖ only serves to place civilians at greater risk. 
The Goldstone Report‘s retrospective analysis of warnings is equal-
ly problematic. Although nothing in Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol 
I or Article 26 of the Hague Convention suggests that the effectiveness of 
warnings should be judged on the basis of whether civilians actually heeded 
the warnings or found safety, the Goldstone Report judges the warnings by 
looking at whether civilians followed them. 71 Indeed, the law contains no 
requirement that the civilian population be able to act on the warnings in 
order to find them effective. Rather, the law requires that we examine 
whether the warnings generally informed civilians that they were at risk and 
should seek shelter.72 In other words, the legal issue is whether they were 
effective in transmitting a warning, not whether the civilians actually 
heeded them. The sheer numbers involved in Gaza—165,000 phone calls 
and 2.5 million leaflets—certainly point to an affirmative answer. 
By the Goldstone Report‘s standards—which do not reflect existing 
law—states simply will not issue warnings because no warnings will meet 
these standards and still enable effective military operations. The effect 
would be the exact opposite of what the Goldstone Report purports to 
achieve—rather than greater protection for civilians through more effective 
warnings, we would be left with conflicts in which states eschew warnings 
completely because this (hypothetical for now) standard would simply be 
too high to meet, leaving innocent civilians unprotected. 
  
 69 See Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 
in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES (SYMPOSIUM IN HONOUR 
OF KNUT IPSEN) 11, 35–36 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping, eds. 2007). 
 70 Id. at 42–43 (recognizing the danger that ―the more a military is capable of conducting 
‗clean‘ warfare, the greater its legal obligations, and the more critical the international com-
munity will be of any instance of collateral damage and incidental injury (even when un-
avoidable).‖). 
 71 Goldstone Report, supra note 4, at 128–33.  In fact,  however, the very language of both 
provisions, speaking of attacks that ―may affect‖, AP I, art. 57(2)(c), the civilian population, 
accounting for ―circumstances‖ or events within the commander‘s ―power‖, Hague IV, art. 
26, leads to the conclusion that the law focuses on the content and nature of the warnings at 
the time and whether they were reasonable and effective under the circumstances. 
 72 AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(c); Hague IV, supra note 30, art. 26. 
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2.   Defender‘s obligation to take precautions 
Although Additional Protocol I emphasizes the attacking party‘s af-
firmative obligation to take precautions in planning and launching attacks, 
this obligation in no way diminishes the defending party‘s obligations.73 
Recognizing that the party in control of the territory where the conflict is 
taking place is often best situated to protect civilians from the unfortunate 
consequences of war, Additional Protocol I places obligations on the de-
fending party as well.74 Article 58, entitled ―Precautions against the effects 
of attacks,‖ requires that parties shall, to the extent feasible:  
[E]ndeavour to remove the civilian population, individual civilians and ci-
vilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives; 
(b) avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated 
areas; [and] (c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian 
population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control 
against the dangers resulting from military operations.
75
 
Indeed, the Goldstone Report specifically ―emphasize[s] that the 
launching of attacks from or in the vicinity of civilian buildings and pro-
tected areas are serious violations of the obligation on the armed groups to 
take constant care to protect civilians from the inherent dangers created by 
military operations.‖76 This statement recognizes what seems apparent from 
the wording of Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I—and is critically im-
portant in a conflict like that in Gaza—that the obligation to take ―constant 
care‖ applies to the entirety of the civilian populations affected by the con-
flict and is not limited only to the civilian population of the attacked party. 
Parties have an obligation to protect their own civilians from the conse-
quences of their own offensive actions as well as those of the enemy. 
In practice, however, the report gives the defending party‘s obliga-
tions short shrift. Greater focus on the attacking party‘s obligations in recent 
years has led some to argue that the recent shift in emphasis overall from 
defender to attacker creates perverse incentives for the defender to use the 
civilian population as a shield. They further insist that ―the international 
  
 73 See PROTOCOL COMMENTARY, supra note 34, ¶ 2191([A]lthough the obligation to take 
―constant care‖ appears in Article 57, which addresses the attacking party, the Commentary 
suggests that both parties have such an obligation: ―the term ‗military operations‘ should be 
understood to mean any movement, manoeuvres, and other activities whatsoever carried out 
by the armed forces with a view to combat.‖). 
 74 See id. ¶ 2240 (―Belligerents may expect their adversaries to conduct themselves [law-
fully] and to respect the civilian population, but they themselves must also cooperate by 
taking all possible precautions for the benefit of their own population as is in any case in 
their own interest.‖). 
 75 AP I, supra note 2, art. 58. 
 76 Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 495. 
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community must re-direct its attention and disapproval to those who inten-
tionally place noncombatants in danger to achieve military and political 
objectives; if it fails to do so, it serves as an ‗enabler‘ for those who delibe-
rately place civilians at risk.‖77 The Goldstone Report‘s approach does in-
deed pose this risk.  
Paragraph (b) of Article 58, regarding precautions against locating 
military objectives in densely populated areas, is particularly relevant to the 
conflict in Gaza. Curiously, the Goldstone Report fails to mention Article 
58 at all. This approach raises two significant legal problems:  first, the ob-
vious failure to address the location of military objectives in densely popu-
lated areas; and second, the transmutation of the intent element of human 
shielding to potential violations of Article 58(b). The report concludes that 
―there are indications that Palestinian armed groups launched rockets from 
urban areas.‖78 It neglects to recognize, however, that in this particular con-
flict, the rocket launchers themselves were military objectives for Israel—
one of the main goals of Operation Cast Lead was to eliminate the ability of 
Palestinian armed groups to fire rockets at civilian areas in southern Israel.79 
Therefore, when Palestinian armed groups launched rockets from civilian 
areas in Gaza, they were locating military objectives in densely populated 
areas, in direct violation of Article 58(b) of Additional Protocol I.80  
The failure to condemn this violation—indeed to even mention it—
shows the report‘s failure to recognize fully the obligations of the defending 
party, especially in the complicated scenarios of contemporary conflicts. 
Just as the densely populated nature of Gaza does not relieve Israel of its 
obligations to distinguish between civilian and military objectives and take 
precautions, so it correspondingly does not relieve Palestinian armed groups 
of their obligations under Article 58. For civilians caught in the zone of 
combat and for military planners and commanders making targeting deter-
minations, the continued force of this obligation is critical. Unfortunately, 
the absence of any mention of this obligation simply gives militants free 
rein to exploit the civilian population and the principles of IHL. 
As a result of this failure to address Article 58, the Goldstone Re-
port analyzes precautions taken, or not taken, by Hamas and other Palestini-
  
 77 Richard D. Rosen, Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian 
Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 683, 691–92 (2009). 
 78 Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 450. 
 79 THE OPERATION IN GAZA, supra note 3, ¶ 16. 
 80 CIHL, supra note 16, at 430 (citing Australia Defence Force Manual, § 553) (In addi-
tion, ―the law of armed conflict requires that the defence should be conducted from the posi-
tion which would cause the least danger to civilians and civilian objects‖). One could also 
argue that such attacks violated Article 57(2)(a)(ii) as well, which obligates parties to ―take 
all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoid-
ing, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects.‖ Id. 
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an armed groups solely within the framework of the prohibition on shiel-
ding. The language of the provisions on shielding does include a measure of 
intent—civilians ―shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune 
from military operations,‖ and parties shall not direct the movement of civi-
lians ―in order to attempt to shield military objectives.‖81 That intent, how-
ever, is only necessary for the purpose of ―finding that a party is using the 
civilian population living in the area of the fighting as a human shield,‖82 
not for the purpose of finding a violation of Article 58(b)‘s prescription 
against locating military objectives in densely populated areas. By applying 
the incorrect standard and requiring intent where IHL requires none, the 
Goldstone Report identifies no violation of Article 58; rather, it merely 
states that it could not ―obtain any direct evidence that [rockets were 
launched from urban areas] with the specific intent of shielding the rocket 
launchers from counterstrokes by the Israeli armed forces.‖83  
Aside from the fact that it is hard to envision what purpose Hamas 
could have had other than shielding the rocket launchers from attack, the 
report‘s analysis encourages those who wish to take advantage of the civi-
lian population‘s presence. The report thus directly facilitates the manipula-
tion of the law for tactical purposes—if the standard were as stated in the 
Goldstone Report, militants could locate rocket launchers and other military 
objectives in civilian areas with impunity. Again, the effect is to endanger 
civilians rather than protect them. In contrast, Article 58‘s clear prohibition 
on locating military objectives in densely populated areas, regardless of 
intent, offers much greater protection for civilians than does the Goldstone 
Report‘s approach.  
III.  INTO THE FUTURE: THE EFFECT ON LOAC ADHERENCE AND 
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 
Although the term lawfare now often has a wide range of connota-
tions, from the strategic and tactical manipulations highlighted in this article 
to civil litigation efforts under the Alien Tort Claims Act to criminal prose-
cution using universal jurisdiction, the strategic and tactical raise the great-
est concerns for the effective implementation and enforcement of IHL. In-
deed, in these two arenas, lawfare poses fundamental challenges to two pri-
mary and critical goals:  protection of civilians during conflict and effective 
mission accomplishment. Although IHL recognizes and accounts for civi-
lian deaths and injuries—meaning that the mere fact of harm to civilians 
does not connote a violation of the law—the Goldstone Report adopts a 
framework in which civilian deaths and the destruction of civilian property 
  
 81 AP I, supra note 2, art 51(7). 
 82 Goldstone Report, supra note 4, ¶ 491. 
 83 Id. ¶ 480. 
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necessarily are violations of the law. The impact of this approach, which is 
not reflected in IHL, means that the tactical and strategic goals of lawfare 
are rewarded rather than held at bay. 
First, the Goldstone Report presents grave risks for the principle of 
distinction. Although the report appears to place protection of civilians as its 
primary goal, focusing overwhelmingly on the civilian deaths in Gaza, its 
application of IHL actually undermines that goal time and again. The gener-
al acquiescence in the style of fighting favored by Hamas and other armed 
groups—fighting in civilian dress, launching rockets from civilian locations, 
storing munitions in hospitals, and so on—has the extraordinarily proble-
matic result of encouraging such behavior both by failing to condemn it and 
by misstating the legal responsibility of state forces who respond. In effect, 
―[i]t does not take much military savvy as an insurgent leader to figure out 
how to take advantage of a legal system where only one side is required to 
mark themselves as combatants and the other side has the opportunity to 
hide amongst those it is illegal for the uniformed armies to kill.‖84 The re-
sult: more civilians at risk, more civilian casualties, and greater destruction 
of civilian infrastructure. 
If a guerrilla movement were systematically to take advantage of the sur-
prise element that lies in attacking while posing as civilians until – as one 
expert said ―a split second before the attack‖ – it would inevitably under-
mine the presumption, which is vital to maintain, namely that unarmed 
persons in civilian dress, do not attack. The result of undermining or eli-
minating this presumption is bound to have dreadful consequences for the 
civilian population.
85
 
The risk to soldiers increases as well, because they are repeatedly forced to 
wait an additional second or more to try to identify who is an innocent civi-
lian and who is a legitimate target—but without any way to do so effective-
ly. As soldiers seek to protect innocent civilians by holding their fire, they 
continually expose themselves to the risk of perfidious suicide bombers and 
other attackers who hide amongst the civilian population. Beyond these 
dangers to soldiers and innocent civilians alike, the erosion of distinction‘s 
mandate is also ―extremely prejudicial to the chances of serious implemen-
tation of the rules of humanitarian law; any tendency to blur the distinction 
[between combatants and civilians] must be sanctioned heavily by the inter-
  
 84 Jensen, supra note 14, at 257. 
 85 MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 254 (1982). See 
also Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 
1497 (2004) (claiming ―regularization‖ of armed forces is crucial for the Hague laws to 
function correctly). 
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national community; otherwise the whole system based on the concept of 
distinction will break down.‖86 
Second, the strategic ramifications of the use of lawfare are equally 
great. Media reports on civilian casualties caused by state forces, whether in 
Gaza, Iraq, or Afghanistan, produce an immediate outcry and debates about 
the lawfulness of the military operation, the motives of the state forces, and 
the potential for criminal liability. In contrast, reports of civilian casualties 
caused by militants receive little, if any, attention. For example, there re-
mains a general perception that U.S. forces—and the use of air power in 
particular—in Afghanistan are responsible for large numbers of civilian 
deaths, notwithstanding documented evidence that civilian casualties caused 
by multinational forces are steadily decreasing and casualties caused by the 
Taliban are increasing.87 Militants use civilian deaths to their advantage on a 
strategic level to undermine support for the military campaign both domes-
tically and internationally. In pursuing their goal of gaining ―political leve-
rage by portraying U.S. forces as insensitive to [IHL] and human rights . . ., 
opponents unconstrained by humanitarian ethics now take the strategy to the 
next level, that of orchestrating situations that deliberately endanger non-
combatants.‖88 Civilians thus become a pawn at the strategic level as well, 
because they are used not only for tactical advantage (e.g., shelter) in specif-
ic situations, but for broader strategic and political advantage as well. 
When investigations into the conduct of hostilities ignore the reali-
ties on the ground by ignoring, or condoning, the impact of lawfare on the 
tactical level, they greatly reinforce the use of these manipulations at the 
strategic level as well. The Goldstone Report‘s conclusions essentially give 
these machinations an official imprimatur—the report faults Israel for civi-
lian deaths and finds little or no fault with Hamas and other armed groups 
for their violations of the principle of distinction. The only result will be 
that non-state forces using these tactics will be emboldened and encouraged 
to continue exploiting and endangering the civilian population for their own 
purposes, which runs directly counter to the basic principles and goals of 
IHL. 
The challenges these behaviors pose are vast; the response must be 
effective and comprehensive. First, above all, the fundamental principles of 
IHL must be respected even in the complexities of modern conflicts and the 
blurring of the lines between combatants and civilians. Both the protection 
of civilians and effective mission fulfillment depend on adherence to the 
  
 86 DIETER FLECK ET AL, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 201 
(1995). 
 87 UN News Service, Afghan Civilian Death Toll Jumps 31 Percent Due to Insurgent 
Attacks, UN NEWS CENTRE (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story. 
asp?NewsID=35575. 
 88 Dunlap, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
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law and its principles. Second, interpretations of the law that encourage or 
ratify the use of lawfare must be countered and the existing legal framework 
shored up to prevent erosion of key principles such as distinction, propor-
tionality, military necessity, and humanity. Finally, we must seek effective 
ways of holding accountable those who engage in human shielding, perfidy, 
and other violations of IHL that not only endanger the civilians on the 
ground, but contribute to the broader challenges as well. 
 
